Would a Golden Dome protect Britain? How much would it cost? Inside the radical bid to ward off aggression

Defence analyst brings the latest on Iran

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GB

Lt Col Stuart Crawford

By Lt Col Stuart Crawford


Published: 15/05/2026

- 09:55

An Iron Dome project would soon collide with reality, writes former army officer Lt Col Stuart Crawford

In January of this year, US President Donald Trump postulated that the USA might procure a ‘Golden Dome’ anti-ballistic missile system to protect it from burgeoning threats from potential aggressors like Russia, China, and North Korea.

However, the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has now suggested that the missile system might cost as much as $1.2 trillion (£882billion) to develop, deploy, and operate over two decades, much higher than the initial estimated cost of $175 billion (£129billion).

Furthermore, the CBO is unsure whether the system will operate properly, leaving the continental USA vulnerable to attack. The proposed name ‘Golden Dome’ is a hat-tip to Israel’s ‘Iron Dome’ anti-air system, which has played such a large part in protecting Israelis from incoming missiles from Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, and other terrorist groups in the Middle East.


However, the proposed US Dome would be considerably more sophisticated, employing space-based sensors and interceptors among other attributes.

What may not be generally understood, however, is that Israel’s system has three parts, not just one.

It is a layered air defence construct and its three components are; the Iron Dome missile system for short to medium range interceptions out to 70 kilometre range; the David’s Sling medium range system, designed to intercept tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft, and drones at ranges up to 300 km; and the Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 systems which target long-range ballistic missiles in the upper atmosphere and space.

Iron Dome intercepts missileWould a Golden Dome protect Britain? How much would it cost? Inside the radical bid to ward off aggression |

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Iron Dome is the populist name for this comprehensive and overlapping defence, and claims of up to 90 per cent success rates for interceptions have been made, although clearly it is not impervious; too many incoming missiles have impacted on Israeli soil over recent months for it to be thought 100 per cent effective.

It seems probable, therefore, that any future ‘Golden Dome’ protecting the USA will be a similar layered protective screen, albeit using up-to-date technology.

But it too will not be 100 per cent effective, and now it appears it will not be affordable either. This brings us back to assessing what the UK has to protect our airspace and territory from aerial attack from drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles.

In terms of the first two, Britain’s Sky Sabre and Sea Ceptor are advanced, 21st-century air defence systems operated by the UK Armed Forces, sharing the Common Anti-Air Modular Missile (CAMM), which protects against aircraft, drones, and cruise missiles; both seem well up to the task.

The main problem here is that there aren’t enough of them to go round. But as for anti-ballistic missile defence, the UK has nothing at the moment – zilch, nada, zero.

True, the Royal Navy's Type 45 destroyers are undergoing significant upgrades to enhance their capabilities against ballistic missiles, with the first ship expected to be operational with this enhancement in 2027.

This effort is part of the Sea Viper Evolution programme, but all six T45s are not expected to be so equipped until the latter half of 2032.

And the availability of these destroyers is notoriously low. It took HMS Dragon a supreme effort to make ready and transit to the Eastern Mediterranean to protect Cyprus in late March, and the only other one at sea currently is HMS Duncan heading for the North Sea.

All the others are tied up in port, with HMS Daring having spent an astonishing 3,300 days in refit and counting. So, short of parking one T45 in the Thames and perhaps another on the Clyde (to protect the RN nuclear submarine base at Faslane), and assuming that their missile systems have been upgraded and actually work, the UK’s skies are basically open to ballistic missile attack.

And, given the dire state of defence funding, it doesn’t appear likely that the government will be able to do very much about it in the short to medium term, even if the political will was there (which it isn’t).

In short, in this most important context, Britain will be forced to rely on its allies for its defence, assuming always, of course, that they are willing and have the spare capacity to do so aside from their own concerns. Is this any way to run a defence policy? Is this any way to run a country?