Banning the Muslim Brotherhood won't kill the multi-headed hydra of Islamism ensnaring Britain - Fiyaz Mughal

Fiyaz Mughal
Fri, 10 Apr 2026 09:29:31 +0000
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Reform has recently pledged to ban the Muslim Brotherhood, with Nigel Farage, Richard Tice and Nadhim Zahawi all voicing support for proscription.

Labour figures, too, have faced lobbying from the Henry Jackson Society to move in a similar direction. Yet these calls, while politically attractive, are ultimately simplistic and risk being wholly unworkable in practice.

The Conservative position, in contrast, has been more cautious. While a review is understood to be ongoing, there has been no formal move towards a ban.

The reason is straightforward: there is no clearly identifiable, structured organisation in the United Kingdom that can definitively be labelled “the Muslim Brotherhood”.

What exists instead is something far more diffuse, harder to define, and therefore far more difficult to legislate against.

This was recognised in the review led by Sir John Jenkins, commissioned under a previous Conservative government and supported by figures such as Michael Gove.

The review concluded that the Brotherhood is “deliberately opaque” and “habitually secretive”, with a “highly ambiguous relationship with violent extremism”.

In other words, it does not operate as a conventional organisation with membership lists and clear structures. It survives, and indeed thrives, in the shadows.

That conclusion matters. It explains why blanket calls for proscription may generate headlines but yield little in practical outcomes. One cannot ban what cannot be clearly defined.

However, the Jenkins review also made an important and often overlooked point: that association with or alignment to Brotherhood thinking can act as a possible indicator of extremism. This is where the real issue lies, not in chasing an organisational ghost, but in understanding and challenging the ideological legacy that continues to circulate.

That legacy is not abstract. It can be identified through patterns of rhetoric and belief. It includes narratives that frame Muslims in the West as perpetually victimised, the promotion of the idea that secularism is inherently hostile to Islam, and the assertion that religion and politics are inseparable.

It can also be seen in positions that undermine democratic norms, diminish the rights of women, or suggest that Western societies are morally decaying and destined to fail.

More concerning still are attempts, often subtle, to marginalise dissenting Muslim voices. Those who advocate for pluralism, secular governance, or reform within Islam can find themselves sidelined or pressured. These are warning signs that policymakers should take seriously.

The challenge, therefore, is not to pursue blunt instruments but to develop a more intelligent and evidence-led framework. Political parties must move beyond slogans and towards clear criteria for engagement.

They should ask what values are being promoted, what narratives are being reinforced, and what impact these have on cohesion and integration.

As we approach future elections, the issue of the Muslim Brotherhood risks becoming a political football: simplified, amplified, and weaponised.

That would be a mistake. If we are serious about tackling Islamist extremism and protecting the integrity of our democratic society, we must focus not on labels, but on ideas, behaviours, and their real-world consequences.

Only then can we respond with clarity, credibility, and purpose.